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In this paper, we present an idea of adopting certifi-
cateless public key encryption (CL-PKE) schemes over
mobile ad hoc network (MANET), which has not been
explored before. In current literature, essentially there
exists two main approaches, namely the public key
cryptography and identity-based (ID-based) cryptog-
raphy. Unfortunately, they both have some inherent
drawbacks. In the public key cryptography system, a
certificate authority (CA) is required to issue certifi-
cates between users’ public keys and private keys to
ensure their authenticity, whilst in an ID-based cryp-
tography system, users’ private keys are generated by
a key generation center (KGC), which means the KGC
knows every users’ keys (the key escrow problem). To
avoid these obstacles, Al-Riyami and Paterson pro-
posed certificateless cryptography systems where the
public keys do not need to be certified and the KGC
does not know users’ keys. Essentially, certificateless
cryptography relies between the public key cryptog-
raphy and ID-based cryptography. In this work, we
adopt this system’s advantage over MANET. To im-
plement CL-PKE over MANET and to make it prac-
tical, we incorporate the idea of Shamir’s secret shar-
ing scheme. The master secret keys are shared among
some or all the MANET nodes. This makes the system
self-organized once the network has been initiated. In
order to provide more flexibility, we consider both a
full distribution system and a partial distribution sys-
tem. Furthermore, we carry out two simulations to
support our schemes. We firstly simulate our scheme
to calculate our encryption, decryption and key distri-
bution efficiency. Then we also simulate our scheme
with AODV to test the network efficiency. The simu-
lations are performed over OPNET.
Keywords: certificateless cryptography, MANET,
AODV, OPNET, public key cryptography, identity-
based cryptography, secret sharing
1 Introduction
The mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a network
that is merely comprised of mobiles devices without
any pre-established infrastructures. In this type of net-
work, routing is an essential problem, since unlike a
traditional network, MANET has no access point for
the nodes to connect to and communicate. With the
fast development of MANET technology, security be-
comes an important issue. With more and more ap-
plications developed over MANET devices, the need
for MANET security has increased significantly over
the last few years. One of the main discussion points
in this topic is the key distribution schemes. Several
solutions have been proposed in the literature, but nev-
ertheless they have raised several drawbacks, such as
the reliance on a single online authority [8, 5] or the
unconditional trust to a trusted authority in the ID-
based system [4]. When the schemes are built from
public key cryptography, it will require certificate au-
thorization that makes it impractical. Nonetheless, an
ID-based system requires a significant amount of trust
to a single entity which also makes it impractical.
Our Contribution
In this paper, we consider a different approach to the
existing solutions, namely to incorporate the certifi-
cateless cryptography into MANET. As we shall show
in this paper, the adoption of certificateless cryptog-
raphy to the MANET scenario is not very straightfor-
ward. Nonetheless, by combining the secret sharing
schemes with the certificateless cryptography, we ob-
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tain an efficient and secure MANET scheme. Our con-
tribution is to apply the existing certificateless cryp-
tography into MANET using a threshold secret shar-
ing scheme. We firstly create a generic model based on
the above ideas and then we proposed our scheme that
comprises of a combination of certificateless cryptogra-
phy and secret sharing scheme. To support our idea,
we implement our schemes in OPNET to analyze its
efficiency and practicality.
Paper Organization
The rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we
will review the background required throughout this
paper that includes the background on cryptography,
MANET and some existing MANET key management
schemes. In Section 3, we will propose our scheme that
comprises of a combination of certificateless cryptogra-
phy and secret sharing scheme. In Section 4, we present
the result of our simulation in both C language and
OPNET. Finally, the last Section concludes the paper.
2 Background
2.1 Certificateless Cryptography
Public Key Cryptography The concept of the
public key cryptography scheme was put forth by Diffie
and Hellman in their seminal paper in [11] and the
first realization of the public key cryptography was pro-
posed by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman in 1978 [1]. In a
public key cryptography system, there are two separate
keys involved: the public key and the private key. In
an encryption scheme scenario, the public key is used
for encrypting the message and the private key is used
to decrypt the message. The main idea of this sys-
tem relies on the fact that if the private key is known,
then it is easy to compute the public key, but not vice
versa. Therefore, the public key can be made public
and known by anyone. This method makes it possi-
ble for a user to deliver some messages without any
pre-established shared keys.
Nonetheless, the key management is the main stum-
bling block in the public key scenario, since it is not
possible for anyone who obtains someone’s public key
from a public place, such as the Internet, to verify the
authenticity of this public key. Therefore, there is a
necessity to authenticate this public key and hence, an
adversary cannot replace a genuine public key with any
other public key of its choice. Henceforth, a trusted
third party called the certification authority (CA) is
required. The role of the CA is to issue certificates on
public keys for users. Then, anyone who obtains any
user’s public key can verify its authenticity by verifying
whether the certificate attached is indeed valid. This
is the main drawback of this system.
Identity-based Cryptography The concept of
identity-based (ID-based) cryptography was intro-
duced by Shamir in [13] to solve the main drawback
of public key cryptography by removing the necessity
of the certificates. In an ID-based system, the iden-
tity of users are used as their public keys and there-
fore there is no need to have this public keys (i.e. the
users’ identity) certified. The secret key is derived from
the user’s identity together with the trusted authority,
called the Private Key Generator (PKG)’s secret key.
Nonetheless, this makes the system impractical since
the PKG will know all the secret keys that the users
have and therefore, the PKG can always impersonate
any users. This inherent problem in ID-based cryp-
tography is known as the key escrow problem, which
makes the ID-based system only practical in a closed
organization. An unconditional trust to the PKG is
required and it is assumed that the PKG will not be
malicious.
Certificateless Cryptography In 2003, Al-Riyami
and Paterson [3] proposed a new system known as
certificateless cryptography. The idea of certificateless
cryptography is to gather the strength of both the pub-
lic key cryptography and ID-based cryptography and
to avoid the drawbacks that these two systems have. In
this system, there is a trusted authority called the Key
Generation Centre (KGC) that will need to generate a
partial secret key for the users, given the users’ identity.
Nonetheless, each user also needs to generate his/her
own partial secret key and based on these two pieces of
information (partial secret keys), the user can generate
the public key that needs to be published. Although
this system incorporates a public key, this public key
does not need to be certified as this public key has been
‘implicitly’ certified by the partial secret key issued by
the KGC. Hence, to verify the authenticity of the pub-
lic key, the KGC’s public key needs to be involved. We
note that there is no key escrow problem in this model
as the KGC does not know the user’s secret key. The
KGC can only know the partial secret key but not the
complete secret key as some part of the secret key is
generated by the user himself/herself.
2.2 Mobile Ad Hoc Network
MANET Overview Mobile Ad-hoc Network
(MANET) is one of the most widely discussed and re-
searched areas in the field of wireless communications.
In a traditional network, mobile devices connect to
each other via an access point. If the access point
fails, users cannot communicate to each other. In the
MANET scenario, no access point or node is required.
MANET is a network that only consists of mobile
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devices such as personal digital assistants (PDAs)
and laptops. It requires no centralized infrastructure
like basic switch centers or wireless routers. Nodes
connect to each other via the ad hoc model. Nodes
work not only as a host but also as a router, joining
or leaving the network at any moment, making the
network highly dynamic.
Because of MANET’s non-centralized infrastructure
and highly dynamic characteristics, routing is an es-
sential part of this network. Without routing, devices
are unable to connect to each other, and the network
becomes crippled. Routing protocols for the Internet
do not perform very well in MANET. Routes may be-
come invalid at any second, which may be caused by
a slight movement of one node. In this case, dynamic
adaptive routing protocols must be applied.
AODV Ad-hoc on-demand distance vector (AODV)
routing protocol is an on-demand routing protocol in
MANET proposed by Perkins, Belding-Royer and Das
[10, 7]. In this protocol, nodes do not perform routing
until a request is generated or received. It uses three
types of control messages: Route Request (RREQ),
Route Reply (RREP) and Route Error (RERR) to con-
trol the whole network.
In order to discover a Destination Node (DN), the
source node (SN) broadcasts a RREQ message. A se-
quence number is given to each node which has received
a RREQ message. When this RREQ message finds its
way to the DN, a RREP message is generated, sending
back to the SN the same way the RREQ came from,
and thus a route is established. After this, this route
will be assigned with a lifetime. Every time a message
is transferred via this route, the lifetime is refreshed.
When the lifetime is expired, the route becomes invalid.
MANET Security MANET is equipped with some
security aspects. It has neither pre-existing infrastruc-
ture nor predictable network topology, so data is trans-
ferred through nodes in a multi-hop way. The resources
of a MANET device, such as battery life or transmit-
ting range, are always limited.
However its physical security is poor. This means
that MANET devices can be easily stolen and the phys-
ical signals that a MANET device uses may also be
vulnerable to a spoofing attack.
When discussing MANET security, we mainly con-
sider two approaches: the key management and rout-
ing security. In this paper, we merely consider the key
management schemes. The key management schemes
handle the generation, establishment and distribution
and revocation of keys. We will elaborate the three
main key management schemes in MANET in the fol-
lowing section.
2.3 Existing Key Management
Schemes
Partially distributed authority scheme Par-
tially distributed authority scheme was firstly proposed
by Zhou and Hass [8]. In their scheme it is assumed
that there is an Offline Trust Third Party (OTTP)
constructing and distributing keys for all the nodes.
Firstly, this OTTP generates a pair of master pub-
lic/secret keys. The master public key (mpk) is known
by every node in the MANET, while the master secret
key (msk) is divided into n parts, where each part is
presented by Si(i = 0, 1, 2...n). Then OTTP picks n
arbitrary nodes, randomly distributed with msk parts.
These n nodes collectively form the Distributed Cer-
tificate Authority (DCA).
The OTTP then generates certificates for all of the
nodes and distributes them respectively. In Zhou and
Hass’ scheme, those certificates are fully stored in each
DCA node as well. This provides authentication from
potential threads of unauthorized nodes. Any unau-
thorized node does not have valid certificate, thus will
not get key shares from DCA nodes.
Assuming the threshold of the system is t, node i
needs to obtain at least t+1 msk shares to retrieve the
msk. Node i will send out requests to t DCA nodes,
with a certificate of its own. Once the certificate is ver-
ified by a DCA node, which is achieved by comparing
with DCA’s certificate database, the DCA node will
reply with a share of msk. After successfully obtain t
valid key shares, node i will retrieve the msk.
This brings an imbalanced load to the DCA nodes,
because those DCA nodes are in charge of the whole
network. This scheme also requires pre-establishment
before the initiation. Certificates of each node are pre-
stored in the DCA nodes.
In order to solve these problems, Yi and Kravers pro-
posed a modified model [6]. It makes use of the broad-
cast certification request (CREQ) and the certification
reply (CREP) packets. It allows nodes to broadcast the
certification request (CREQ) packets using a flooding
method. Any DCA which gets this packet answers with
a certification reply (CREP). If the node successfully
collects t + 1 CREPs, it will be able to reconstruct the
full certificate. If the certificate is valid, the certifi-
cation is successful; otherwise, the node will generate
another CREQ packet.
Fully distributed authority scheme A fully dis-
tributed authority scheme is a modification of par-
tially distributed certificate authority scheme firstly
proposed by Luo et al. [5]. This scheme also makes
use of the (n, t) threshold secret sharing scheme [12].
The difference between Luo et al.’s model and Zhou
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and Hass’ model relies on the following: In Zhou and
Hass’ model, DCA nodes are randomly selected from
all the nodes while Luo et al’s model uses all of the
nodes in the MANET to form the DCA. The msk is
shared among all the nodes and for this reason, this
scheme is called ‘fully distributed’.
Firstly, an offline trusted third party (OTTP) gen-
erates an RSA key pair mpk/msk . The mpk is shared
in the MANET. The msk is divided into n shares; each
part is a Secret Key (sk) for every node. Nodes’ Public
Keys (pk) are created from those sks.
Then the OTTP creates certificates signed with the
msk for each node, in order to bind nodes’ unique ID
with nodes’ public key. These certificates are unforge-
able and are stored in every node in the network.
When a node, namely, node A, needs to get the msk,
it sends out requests to all its one hop neighbouring
nodes. If one of the neighbour nodes, namely, node B,
gets the request, it compares node A’s ID and certifi-
cate pair with the information B stored in its database.
If the result is positive, node B will send back its own
share of the msk, as well as the certificate of itself. If
the number of the nodes which replied with valid cer-
tificates and key shares is more than t, the node A
obtains the msk.
ID-Based distribution scheme One of the
Identity-based authority schemes was proposed by
Boneh and Franklin [4], which is an upgraded solution
to Zhou and Hass’ scheme. It replaced the DCA with a
threshold private key generator (PKG). Initially, users
in the network will collectively form the PKG. This
PKG will generate a pair of mpk/msk, and the msk is
divided and shared among all the initial nodes. It is
not stated in [4] how this PKG is formed nor how the
msk is distributed. In [2],Van Der Merwe, Dawoud
and McDonald designed an OTTP which is called cen-
tralized PKG to generate and distribute keys. After
the initiation, the user’s identity is used as the user’s
public key, while each PKG node will generate a part
of this user’s private key, which is based on the user’s
identity. In this way, each user needs to obtain t + 1
parts of private key to retrieve the private key.
3 CL-PKE over MANET
3.1 Generic Model
We assume that at the beginning of the network there is
a Key Generator Center (KGC) which generates partial
secret keys for all the users. We also denote n to be
the number of original nodes and t to be the pattern of
security level of the threshold system. Those n nodes
collectively form a Distributed Key Generator Center
(DKGC). After the initiation, the KGC will go offline,
and the network becomes self-organized. We define
those nodes that get partial secret keys from the KGC
to be the original nodes, those nodes that get partial
secret keys from DKGC to be the new-joint nodes and
those nodes that collectively form the DKGC to be
DKGC nodes.
• Setup:
This algorithm takes as input a security parameter
1k and returns the master private key msk and
master public key mpk. This algorithm is run by
the KGC, in order to setup a certificateless ad hoc
system.
• Extract-partial-secret-key:
This algorithm takes as input the master public
key mpk, the master private key msk and an iden-
tity ID=i∈ {0, 1}∗. It outputs a partial private
key  i. This algorithm runs by KGC once at the
initiation of the network.
• Extract-master-secret-key-shares:
This algorithm takes as input the master private
key msk and an identity ID=i∈ {0, 1}∗.It outputs
a master secret key shares msksi. This algorithm
runs by KGC once at the initiation of the network.
• Extract-partial-secret-key-share-and-
master-secret-key-share:
This algorithm takes as input the master public
key mpk, the master private key share msksi
from a DKGC node and an identity new of a
new-jointly node. It outputs a share of partial
user private key  new,i and a share of master
secret key share msksnew,i , i ∈ {0, 1...n}. This
algorithm runs by DKGC nodes.
• Extract-master-secret-key-shares-DKGC:
This algorithm takes as input the master pub-
lic key mpk, an identity ID=new ∈ {0, 1}∗, and
t shares of master private key share msksnew,i,
i ∈ {0, 1...n}. It outputs a master secret key share
msksnew. This algorithm runs by the new-joint
node.
• Extract-partial-secret-key-DKGC:
This algorithm takes as input the master public
key mpk, a user identity ID=new and t shares
of partial user private key  new,i, i ∈ {0, 1...}.
It outputs a user partial secret key  new. This
algorithm runs by the new-joint node.
• Set-user-keys:
This algorithm takes as input the master public
key mpk, a user identity ID=i, a partial private
key  i and a secret value xi. It outputs a user
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public/private key pair (pki/ski) or an error sym-
bol. This algorithm runs by all the nodes.
• Encryption:
This algorithm takes as input the master public
key msk, a user’s identity ID=i, a user’s public
key pki and a message msg. It outputs a cipher
text c.
• Decryption:
This algorithm takes as input the master public
key msk, a user’s private key ski and a cipher text
c. It outputs a message msg.
Fully Distributed System In the fully distrib-
uted system, all the nodes will have a share of msk.
They together maintain the stability of the system.
At the initiation stage, the KGC generates a mas-
ter public/private key pair (mpk/msk) using Setup
algorithm. It then generates user partial keys us-
ing Extract-partial-secret-key algorithm and di-
vides msk with Extract-master-secret-key-shares.
The user partial keys  ID and master secret key shares
msksID are distributed to all the origin nodes. Once
this is done, the KGC goes offline, and all the original
nodes become DKGC nodes.
We use the threshold cryptography to provide au-
thentication for new jointly nodes. A new-joint nodes
need to successfully contact at least t DKGC nodes.
Those DKGC nodes will run Extract-partial-secret-
key-share-and-master-secret-key-share algorithm
for the new-joint node. Once this new-joint node ob-
tains t shares of msksnew,i and t shares of  new,i,
it will be able to derive a master secret key share
msksnew and a partial secret key  new by Extract-
master-secret-key-shares-DKGC and Extract-
partial-secret-key-DKGC respectively, and it be-
comes a DKGC node. The number of DKGC nodes
rises with the increase of node numbers.
DKGC nodes use Set-user-keys algorithm to calcu-
late their own public/private keys. The public keys will
be broadcasted all through the network so that nodes
can communicate to each other with Encryption and
Decryption algorithms.
Partially Distributed System In a partially dis-
tributed system, a certain number of nodes will become
DKGC nodes. The msk is only shared between these
nodes. They are responsible for issuing partial secret
key for new coming nodes. This system differs from
fully distribution system that :
1. For a new-joint node, the DKGC nodes only is-
sue partial secret key shares  new,i, without any
master secret key shares msksnew,i.
2. Once a DKGC node goes offline, a random non-
DKGC node will be picked. Other DKGC nodes
will give this node master secret key shares
msksnew,i, so that this chosen one will become
a new DKGC node. In this model, the number of
DKGC nodes does not increase.
In our model,we pick all the initiation nodes to be the
DKGC nodes.The relationship among the number of
DKGC nodes, the total number of nodes and threshold
of the system will be further discussed in Section 3.3.
3.2 Proposed Scheme
The first certificateless public key encryption scheme
was proposed by Al-Riyami and Paterson. We incor-
porate their work and adopt it to MANET key man-
agement with CL-PKE. The scheme is as follows:
• Setup:
We assume IG is a Bilinear Diffie-Hellman para-
meter generator and k is the security parameter
for the system. This algorithm has four steps.
1. Run the IG generator on an input k, it out-
puts 〈G1, G2, e〉 where G1 and G2 are groups
of prime order q. e: G1 ×G1 → G2 is a pair-
ing.
2. Choose an arbitrary generator P ∈ G1.
3. Select a master private key msk uniformly at
random from Z∗q and set P0 = msk × P.
4. Choose four cryptographic hash functions
H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G1, H2 : G2 → {0, 1},
H3 : {0, 1}m × {0, 1}m → Z∗q and H4 :
{0, 1}m → {0, 1}m, here m will be the bit-
length of plaintexts.
The master public key mpk =
〈G1, G2, e, m, P, P0, H1, H2, H3, H4〉. The mas-
ter private key is msk ∈ Z∗q . The message
space is M = {0, 1}m and the ciphertext space
C = {0, 1}2m × G1.
• Extract-partial-secret-key:
This algorithm takes as input an ID ∈ {0, 1}∗ and
carries out the following steps.
1. Compute QID = H1(ID) ∈ G1.
2. Output the partial private key  ID = msk×
QID ∈ G∗1.
Any user can verify its partial secret key by check-
ing e( ID, P) = e(QID, P0).
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• Extract-master-secret-key-shares:
We assume a polynomial f(x) can be defined as




Where a1, a2...at are uniformly distributed over a
finite field F. This algorithm takes as input an
ID ∈ {0, 1}∗ and outputs a master secret key share
msksi = f(IDi). From this formula we can com-
pute msk by
f(0) = msk =
t+1∑
i=1
[L̂(0, IDi) × f(IDi)] ∈ Z∗q




[L̂(x, IDi) × f(IDi)]
where L̂(α, β) is the appropriate Lagrangian co-




γ∈S,γ =β(α − γ)∏
γ∈S,γ =β(β − γ)
• Extract-partial-secret-key-share-and-
master-secret-key-share:
Giving a master secret key share of node i msksi
and a new-joint node’s ID= new, this algorithm
takes the following steps.
1. A partial secret key share is calculated by
 new,i = L̂(0, IDi) × msksi × Qnew =
L̂(0, IDi) × f(IDi) × Qnew ∈ G1
2. A master secret key share is calculated by
msksnew,i = L̂(IDnew, IDi) × msksi ∈ Z∗q
• Extract-partial-secret-key-DKGC:
This algorithm takes as input t partial secret key






i=1 L̂(0, IDi) ×
f(IDi) × Qnew = msk × Qnew ∈ G1
• Extract-master-secret-key-shares:
This algorithm takes as input t master secret





i=1 L̂(IDnew, IDi) × msksi = f(IDnew) ∈ Z∗q
• Set-user-keys:
This algorithm takes as select a user’s secret value
xID ∈ Z∗q , input the master public key mpk and
user’s partial secret key  ID. It outputs user’s
secret key ID = xID ×  ID and user’s public
key pkID =< XID, YID >, where XID = xIDP
and YID = xIDmskP.
• Encryption:
For a message msg ∈ M and an identity ID ∈
{0, 1}∗ with its public key pkID =< XID, YID >,
the encryption algorithm takes as follows:
1. Check the public key by e(XID, P0) =
e(YID, P). If the result is negative, abort the
encryption and output an error symbol.
2. Compute QID = H1(ID) ∈ G∗1.
3. Choose a random number σ ∈ {0, 1}m.
4. Set r = H3(σ, msg)
5. Compute and output ciphertext:
c = < rP, σ ⊕ H2(e(QID, YID)r),
msg ⊕ H4(σ) >
• Decryption:
Suppose c =< U, V, W >∈ C. To decrypt this
cipher text with private key skID:
1. Compute V ⊕ H2(e(ID, U)) = σ′.
2. Compute W ⊕ H4(σ′) = msg′.
3. Set r′ = H3(σ′, msg′) and test if U = r′P. If
not, output an error symbol and reject the
ciphertext.
4. Output msg′ as the decryption of c.
• Correctness:
σ′ = V ⊕ H2(e(ID, U))
= V ⊕ H2(e(xID ID, rP))
= V ⊕ H2(e(xIDmskID, P)r)
= V ⊕ H2(e(QID, xIDmskP)r)
= V ⊕ H2(e(QID, YID)r)
= σ
msg′ = W ⊕ H4(σ′)
= msg ⊕ H4(σ) ⊕ H4(σ′)
= msg




3.3 Issues and design principles
We incorporate a distributed system to replace the
KGC, so that the network becomes self-organized. This
fully distributed system is based on the threshold cryp-
tography with two patterns (t, n). The pattern t rep-
resents the threshold of the model, which means any
t+1 malicious users can break the system (hence, the
system is upperbounded by t + 1, which means that as
long as there are at most t malicious users, then the
system is considered to be at the ‘secure’ state). The
pattern n represents the total number of users. We
denote n’ to be the maximum number of users, and t’
to be the number of malicious users in the network at
the initiation state. t’ should be less than t to get the
network initiated.
Unfortunately, we cannot anticipate if a new-joint
node is malicious or not. If the system is based on
fully distributed model, then in the worst case, all the
new-joint nodes are malicious, which add up to n’-n+t’
malicious DKGC nodes. In order to keep the system
running well, this n’-n+t’ should be smaller than t.
The system becomes vulnerable when t-t’ nodes join
the network.
If the system is based on the partially distributed
model, every DKGC sends its data to a random non
DKGC node before it goes offline. When t-t’ original
nodes goes offline, and they all replicate themselves to
new-joint node, the system becomes vulnerable.
Fully distributed systems are more efficient, but only
allow a small number of new-joint nodes. Partially
distributed system can be secure as long as certain
amount of origin nodes stay online, but it requires co-
operation between DKGC nodes and new-joint nodes,
and it brings along with extra communication overhead
searching for DKGC nodes. Different systems should
be chosen over different scenarios.
4 Simulation
4.1 Simulation with C
Setup In this simulation, we implement our scheme
with C codes. The programming is based on Pairing
Based Cryptography library (PBC) and GNU MP li-
brary (GMP), which define a large amount of efficient
functions over pairing calculations. The programming
environment is showing as follows:
Result In this simulation, we assume that the
network propagation delay is 0ms, which means once
the partial secret key is generated, it will be sent to
the correspondent node immediately.
CPU Intel T2250 1.73GHz
Ram 1GB
Hard Disk 80GB at 5400rpm
OS Ubuntu 7.01
GCC version 4.1
PBC lib version 0.4.17
GMP lib version 4.2.2
Table 1: Programming Environment
Number of nodes 5 10 20
Keys from KGC 142.756 142.756 142.756
Key shares 13.165 11.315 10.189
Keys from DKGC 156.739 224.295 313.790
Table 2: Result of Simulation I
As shown in table 2, if the partial secret key
comes from the KGC, it takes 142.7ms for a node to
get its key. This time is consist of the time partial
secret key generated by the KGC and the time a
node generates its secret key/public key based on this
partial secret key. On the contrary, if the partial secret
key comes from DKGC nodes, the total generating
time increases to 156.7ms for a network with 5 nodes,
224.3ms for a network with 10 nodes and 313.8ms for
a network with 20 nodes. This time is comprised of
the time for each DKGC node to generate the partial
secret key shares (10-13ms) and the time the node
generates the key based on these shares.
Note that this time will not change too much
because all DKGC nodes generate partial secret key
shares separately and parallel. The reason that key
generating time is much higher than partial secret
key generating time is that the key generating process
involves a few pairing calculation over groups, while
the partial secret key generating process only involves
calculations over the infinite field.
4.2 Simulation with OPNET
Scenarios The second simulation runs over six sce-
narios:
1. 10 nodes in total running in partially distribution
system , consist of 5 DKGC nodes, 1 type I at-
tacker, 1 type II attacker and 3 normal nodes.
2. 10 nodes in total running in fully distribution sys-
tem , all of them are DKGC nodes, consist of 1





Pause Time 1 second
Dimensions of Space 100m × 100m
Radio Range 35m
Initiation Time 100 seconds
Background Traffics 1 packet per second
Packet Size 1024bits
Table 3: The AODV Parameters
3. 10 nodes running in pure AODV system, with 1
type I attacker and 1 type II attacker.
4. 20 nodes in total running in partially distribution
system , consist of 10 DKGC nodes, 2 type I at-
tackers, 2 type II attackers and 6 normal nodes.
5. 20 nodes in total running in fully distribution sys-
tem , all of them are DKGC nodes, consist of 2
type I attackers, 2 type II attackers and 16 nor-
mal nodes.
6. 20nodes running in pure AODV system, with 2
type I attackers and 2 type II attackers.
The attackers are defined as follows:
• Type I attacker does not forward any packets. It
works simply as a sink.
• Type II attacker does wrong routing. It sends
packets to any node other than the correct node.
During the simulation, all the type II attackers
forwards their packets to type I attackers.
AODV parameters The parameters of AODV are
shown in Table 3.
In the simulation, all the nodes’ movement follows
the random waypoint model [9] with a pause time
of 1 second and a maximum velocity of 10m/s. This
mobility model defines that node will pick some ran-
dom waypoint in the wireless domain and move to-
wards the waypoint with a velocity randomly picked
between 0m/s(exclusive) and 10m/s(inclusive). Once
a node gets to its destination, it will pause for 1 second
and then move to the next waypoint. The movement
repeats till the end of simulation.
The space of the wireless domain is 100m × 100m,
and the propagation range for each node is 35 meters.
When the simulation starts, there is an initiation time
for 100 seconds, during which time, no traffic is gener-
ated, except that between nodes and the KGC. After
that stage, the KGC goes offline and each normal node
(including DKGC nodes) will generate a background
traffic, which is 1 packet per second in our simulation.
Once a packet received/generated, it take 0.04 second
for a node to process it. This 0.04 second is the OP-
NET standard average propagation and processing de-
lay. This delay increases to 0.055 second for DKGC
nodes, which is because DKGC nodes need to have
some extra time (10-13ms) to calculate partial secret
key shares and validate public keys. The extra 10-13ms
comes from the result of simulation 1.
Result As we can see from the figures, in a network
with 10 nodes, our scheme generates around 30 per-
cent more traffic than a pure AODV network, but the
packet drop rate decreases to one quarter of pure net-
work. The average route discovery time (0.38s) is a
little higher than pure AODV network (0.32) at first
but than decreases to 0.13s which is 60 percent of the
pure AODV network(0.20s).
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In a network with 20 nodes, our scheme contributes
to the average route discovery time as well, around
0.41s with CL-PKE while 0.71s without CL-PKE.
Nevertheless, the packet drop rate is higher than pure
AODV network. This is probably because our scheme
produces a lot more traffic overhead and some of them
are dropped because of the Type I attacker.
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5 Conclusion
This paper presented the design and the simulation
of a key distribution scheme over mobile ad hoc net-
work, based on the certificateless cryptography and
threshold secret sharing scheme. In this work, we have
successfully issued public/secret keys for users with-
out providing certificates. Our scheme also ensures
that system can work on self-organized networks af-
ter the initiation. From the simulation we found out
that our scheme works extremely well in a small size of
MANET. It reduces both packet drop rate and route
discovery time for around 30 per cent, compared with
pure AODV networks.
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